Liberté d'expression des officiers et faillite des généraux

Lors du Café Stratégique du 7 octobre dernier, le général Desportes a évoqué l'exemple du colonel Gian Gentile et de son avis sur la COIN comme exemple typique de la liberté d'expression des officiers américains, contrastant avec la situation qui prévaut en France. J'en ai d'ailleurs déjà parlé sur ce blog ; voir par exemple Officiers, exprimez-vous... mais bien et pas trop ?

Le Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling

Un autre exemple qui vient à l'esprit est celui du Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, envoyé trois fois en Irak et auteur du célèbre "A failure in generalship" (La faillite des généraux) publié dans l'Armed Forces Journal en 2007. Sur le fond, ce qu'il dit n'est pas en accord avec Gentile, puisqu'il promeut la spécificité du COIN. Mais c'est le ton de la charge qui est assez emblématique, puisqu'il remet totalement en question le système actuel de promotion et d'évaluation (y compris la validation du grade de départ en retraite) des officiers généraux :

For the second time in a generation, the United States faces the prospect of defeat at the hands of an insurgency.
[...]
America’s generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy. The argument that follows consists of three elements. First, generals have a responsibility to society to provide policymakers with a correct estimate of strategic probabilities. Second, America’s generals in Vietnam and Iraq failed to perform this responsibility. Third, remedying the crisis in American generalship requires the intervention of Congress.
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America’s swift defeat of the Iraqi Army, the world’s fourth-largest, in 1991 seemed to confirm the wisdom of the U.S. military’s post-Vietnam reforms. But the military learned the wrong lessons from Operation Desert Storm. It continued to prepare for the last war, while its future enemies prepared for a new kind of war.
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Given the lack of troop strength, not even the most brilliant general could have devised the ways necessary to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq. However, inept planning for postwar Iraq took the crisis caused by a lack of troops and quickly transformed it into a debacle.
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After going into Iraq with too few troops and no coherent plan for postwar stabilization, America’s general officer corps did not accurately portray the intensity of the insurgency to the American public.
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The intellectual and moral failures common to America’s general officer corps in Vietnam and Iraq constitute a crisis in American generalship. Any explanation that fixes culpability on individuals is insufficient. No one leader, civilian or military, caused failure in Vietnam or Iraq. Different military and civilian leaders in the two conflicts produced similar results. In both conflicts, the general officer corps designed to advise policymakers, prepare forces and conduct operations failed to perform its intended functions.
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The need for intelligent, creative and courageous general officers is self-evident. An understanding of the larger aspects of war is essential to great generalship. However, a survey of Army three- and four-star generals shows that only 25 percent hold advanced degrees from civilian institutions in the social sciences or humanities. Counterinsurgency theory holds that proficiency in foreign languages is essential to success, yet only one in four of the Army’s senior generals speaks another language.
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First, Congress must change the system for selecting general officers. Second, oversight committees must apply increased scrutiny over generating the necessary means and pursuing appropriate ways for applying America’s military power. Third, the Senate must hold accountable through its confirmation powers those officers who fail to achieve the aims of policy at an acceptable cost in blood and treasure.
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As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war. By exercising its powers to confirm the retired ranks of general officers, Congress can restore accountability among senior military leaders.

Le système français permet-il que l'on voie émerger des Yingling ou des Gentile de ce côté de l'Atlantique (et de la Manche) ?

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